

houden. Wel vertoont het boek sporen van haastwerk. De merkwaardige plaatsing van de bronnen- en literatuurlijst, respectievelijk vóór en na de noten, alsmede het ontbreken van een index op persoonsnamen zijn daarvan voorbeelden ¹.

¹ In de in de zomer van 1990 onder dezelfde titel verschenen handelseditie van deze dissertatie (Gelderse historische reeks XIX; Zutphen: De Walburg Pers, 1990, 211 blz., ISBN 90 6011 704 2) is dit laatste euvel verholpen door toevoeging van een 'Register van auteurs- en familienamen' en een 'Register van aardrijkskundige namen en adellijke huizen'.

A. J. C. M. Gabriëls

P. Sonnino, *Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, xii + 226 blz., £25,00, ISBN 0 521 24590 1).

Any scholarly work which deals with the *Rampjaar* of 1672 is bound to be of interest to Dutch readers, and the learning which has been packed into this book of 200 pages is enormous. In addition to an unrivalled knowledge of the French diplomatic documents, about twelve other national archives have been visited. As well as the diplomacy, the military preparations and the financial position, room has been found for the weather on the King's progresses, the suicide of Condé's cook when the fish for Louis's dinner failed to arrive on time, the illness of the King's children, and other news of the day. On the other hand, this must mean that for readers less knowledgeable than Professor Sonnino the need to clear a way through thickets of detail and many names makes the main path sometimes difficult to discern; and it is possible to take issue with the interpretation of some of the documents which are cited in profusion in the footnotes.

The book throws no light on Dutch policy. It is essentially a narrative of the development of French policy in the four and a half years before the beginning of the war of 1672. The decision to begin with the siege of Lille in August 1667 may be questioned. It might have been better to begin a few months earlier with the outbreak of the War of Devolution against the Spanish Netherlands, Dutch reactions to it and their influence upon Louis XIV. Colbert's 1667 tariff and the mutually conciliatory letters which Charles II of England and Louis each wrote to Queen Henrietta Maria in April 1667 could also have been mentioned. The omission means that the beginning of the process by which Louis, from being an ally of the Dutch and at war with England, became an ally of England in an attack upon the Dutch, is not described. Louis's decision to offer the 'alternative' as a solution to the war with Spain in September 1667 is not adequately explained, and his letter of 4 January 1668 offering a defensive alliance to Charles II is not discussed at all in the text, though it is cited in a footnote as one of 'Turenne's pressures'. A curiosity here is that Turenne, whom De Witt had thought of as a possible Captain-General early in 1666, was one of the earliest and most vehement proponents of a war with the States-General only two years later.

The consequence is that the Dutch War of 1672 is made to appear simply as Louis's 'war of retribution' against De Witt for the Triple Alliance of 1668; the word 'vendetta' is also used. But though such a motive was undoubtedly present, and Louis talked freely of punishing the alleged ingratitude and presumption of the Dutch, the war was more than that. The events of 1667-1668 had shown that the elimination of the Dutch was an essential preliminary to his plans for the absorption of the Spanish Netherlands, not a diversion from them. It is not really surprising that,

once he was sure of English support Louis at times hankered for the involvement of Spain in the war as well.

There is in fact no support here for the theory currently fashionable in some quarters (based largely on the years from 1690 onwards) that Louis's foreign policy was essentially conservative and defensive. Once more his taste for military glory and the baneful influence of 'the young secretary', Louvois, are stressed and even the old view that he coveted the imperial succession is revived. But in his diplomacy he often appears as vacillatory and ineffective rather than decisive or pursuing a course which was clear in his mind from the outset. And it is clear that his policies did not always command the approval of his ministers. Lionne is portrayed as a cautious and restraining influence, seeking for instance to avoid the prospect of war against Dutch and Spaniards at the same time, and instead of direct opposition preferring to coax and manipulate the King in more moderate courses in Germany. But whether Lionne's death in September 1671, to be succeeded immediately by Louvois and ultimately by Pomponne (here oddly described as 'Louvois in Lionne's clothing'), made any essential difference is doubtful. It is difficult to see Lionne as 'charting his own course toward perpetual peace'; a war would take place under the most sensible conditions and there might be different views of the best way of handling the German states, but war there would certainly be. As for Colbert, he is portrayed here as mainly concerned with the damage that the cost of military preparations would do to his fiscal policies, completely opposed to war; and even being 'faced with an unwanted tariff war with the Dutch', but whatever his peaceful inclinations, when confronted with Louis's positive desire for war, he planned the wartime budget and even showed himself a zealous supporter of hostilities rather than risk losing his own position. Whatever the reluctance of Louis's ministers, in Louvois's words to an intendant on a matter with which he himself disagreed, 'His Majesty must not be served any better than he wants to be'. Louis might hesitate and vacillate under different temporary influences, but in the end it was his choice of ministers and of policies that counted. And from his thirst for glory rather than the mere preservation of the status quo it was Louvois, with his arrogance and his belief in force, who was the beneficiary. The result was that 1672 began a period of more than forty years in the majority of which the Dutch Republic and France were locked in desperate and wasteful hostilities, with profound consequences for both states and for Europe.

K. H. D. Haley

J. R. Bruijn, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, met medewerking van E. M. Jacobs, *Maarten Schaap, een Katwijker ter koopvaardij (1782-1870). Een biografie en een dagboek* (Werken uitgegeven door de Commissie voor zeeschiedenis XVII, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse academie van wetenschappen, afdeling letterkunde nieuwe reeks CXXXV; Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1988, 211 blz., f58,50, ISBN 0 444 85685 4).

Tussen de verdwijning van de VOC en de verschijning van de grote stoomvaartrederijen als de KNSM, de Holland-Amerikalijn of de Rotterdamse Lloyd speelde zich één van de minst bekende, maar meest boeiende bedrijven uit de Nederlandse zeeschiedenis af. De zeilvaart, die aan het eind van de Napoleontische tijd gedoemd leek voor het sterfhuis, maakte in de decennia daarna een indrukwekkende come-back. In die periode van ondergang en herstel leefde Maarten Schaap, koopvaardij kapitein uit Katwijk.