

spreken, maar interessanter wordt het als men daarover onderling in discussie gaat, zoals in de artikelen over de teloorgang van de Riederwaard. Of anders kan annotatie een en ander verduidelijken. Het laatste artikel heeft wel een literatuurlijst, de overige artikelen zijn geannoteerd onder aan de bladzijden en daar worden ook de geraadpleegde archieven vermeld. Enkele artikelen hebben bijlagen.

De bundel sluit niet precies aan bij de publicatie van archivalia in de paleografische atlas, maar beide boeken winnen wel enorm aan betekenis in elkaars nabijheid, zie bijvoorbeeld de beschrijving van de kaart van de Merwede op bladzijde 34-35. Dat zelfde kan zeker ook gezegd worden van de studies onderling in *Ingelanden als uitbaters*. Het is inderdaad een pointillistisch schilderij, maar eigenlijk is het nog niet af. De inleiding eindigt met vragen die nog beantwoord moeten gaan worden.

M. Catania-Peters

L. Sicking, *Neptune and the Netherlands. State, economy and war at sea in the Renaissance* (History of warfare XXIII; Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004, xxxi + 551 blz., €156,-, ISBN 90 04 13850 1).

This book shows how the Habsburg government strove for 'a monopoly of maritime violence organized from the Netherlands' (3) through an Admiralty for all the Netherlands provinces, based until 1560 in the town of Vere (Zeeland). The focus is on four illegitimate descendants of Duke Philip the Good (d. 1467) who were both Lords of Vere and Admirals from 1493 to 1558.

As rulers of the County of Flanders, the dukes of Burgundy often named 'admirals' in the charge of its maritime defense. There was, however, no Admiral for all of the Netherlands provinces of the House of Burgundy until Archduke Maximilian of Habsburg (soon to be Emperor Maximilian I) bestowed this dignity on Philip of Cleves in 1485. Three years later, Maximilian issued an Ordinance governing the Admiralty, based (as Sicking shows) on material from a French admiralty ordinance of 1373. Both in the 1488 text and in a slightly modified Ordinance of 1540 the primary concern was to regulate disputes arising over booty taken by ships operating under letters of marque. Self-help, licensed and in theory controlled by the sovereign, was the key to defense against attack from the sea.

The Admiral's authority was never accepted in the province of Holland, where the greater part of Netherlands shipping was based. But Sicking rightly stresses the independent role of the Lords of Vere in maritime affairs, often in competition with Holland. During Holland's wars against the Wendish cities of the Hanseatic League (1438-1441, 1532-1534), the Lords of Vere did their best to remain neutral, so as not to discourage Hanseatic traders from calling at Vere. During a bitter dispute with Holland over the use of safe-conducts to protect the herring fishery from attacks by French free-booters (1536-1540), 'it certainly looked as if' the Admiral was using his monopoly on the issuance of safe-conducts 'as a means of extending his competence' to Holland (173). In the long run, however, 'the particularism of the Lords of Vere' also had positive implications for the central government, for the Admiral and his sovereign had important common interests, including the defense of the Island of Walcheren.

The center of Netherlands shipping in this period was not Holland, but Walcheren Roads in Zeeland; access to Arnemuiden, the principal out-port for the great entrepot of Antwerp, was controlled from two directions by the Lords of Vere. The landing at Walcheren Roads of three French war galleys, possibly by accident (1546), was what prompted the central government,

with the help of the Admiral, to organize an extensive system of coastal defenses. Moreover, though the States of Holland demanded a permanent war fleet of twenty-five ships, the government chose to create a fleet of only eight vessels (1550-1561); this modest effort reflected both the wishes of Antwerp's merchant shippers, and the willingness of the Netherlands provinces to pay taxes. (Incidentally, the chapter on the fleet and the costs of maintaining it, including such things as depreciation, is particularly good). Holland's more aggressive strategy for making the sovereign of the Netherlands 'master of the sea' would 'eventually enjoy a bright future' (493), but only in the course of the Revolt in which Holland led six other northern provinces in breaking away from Habsburg rule.

Here and there one may disagree. To say that Duke Philip the Good 'hardly concerned himself' with the 1438-1441 war against the Wendish cities (39) is beside the point: Philip gave Holland what it most needed by declaring this to be his war, not just Holland's, and thus limiting activities on behalf of the Wendish cities in Flanders and Zeeland. Also, Dr. Sicking concludes by noting that 'the maritime and world power of the Dutch Republic' was to be brought about not by its five Admiralties, but 'by the East and West India Companies.' (495) But well before the founding of the East India Company (1602), the Admiralties gave the Republic control of the sea lanes between Spain and the Netherlands.

In the main, however, this book succeeds remarkably well in its own terms. It also lays down what could be a stepping stone toward the answers to a long-term historical puzzle. How the Dutch Republic came to be the world's premier naval power has never yet been worked out, for a variety of reasons; one reason has been that we have lacked, until now, a solid account of the Habsburg foundations on which the Dutch Admiralties were able to build.

James D. Tracy

J. Haemers, *De Gentse opstand 1449-1453. De strijd tussen rivaliserende netwerken om het stedelijke kapitaal* (Standen en landen CV; Kortrijk-Heule: UGA, 2004, 503 blz., €78,-, ISBN 90 6768 629 8).

Dit bijzonder informatieve boek behandelt de opstand van de stad Gent tegen Filips de Goede in de jaren 1449-1453. Directe aanleiding voor de opstand was de poging van de Bourgondische hertog om een indirecte belasting op zout in te voeren. De vorst had hiermee tot doel om minder afhankelijk te zijn van andere inkomstenbronnen, zoals beden, waarvoor meer gecompliceerde vergaar- en vergadertechnieken nodig waren. De auteur plaatst de opstand in het kader van het staatsvormingsproces: de centraliserende vorst botst met de belangen van bepaalde groepen in de stedelijke samenleving. De vorst probeert aanvankelijk via informele en diplomatieke kanalen de strijd in zijn voordeel te beslechten. Als deze methoden niet blijken te werken wordt via militaire weg 'de overwinning van de centrale staat' (420) bewerkstelligd. Aan de hand van een uitgebreid prosopografisch onderzoek probeert de auteur de motieven en strategieën van de opstandelingen te achterhalen. In de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 worden de institutionele structuren van beide 'partijen', Gent en de Bourgondische hertog Filips de Goede, uit de doeken gedaan. De hoofdstukken 4 t/m 7 geven een chronologisch overzicht van de opstand waarbij verschillende fases worden onderscheiden.

In hoofdstuk 2 kenmerkt de auteur de Gentse stedelijke elite (net als andere categorieën opmerkelijk genoeg aangeduid met een afkorting — GSE) als een 'elitair 'milieu' dat bestaat uit mensen die in dezelfde sociale omgeving vertoeven en elkaar goed kennen.' (54) Deze vrij